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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
PAULA POULSON, 
Defendant/Appellant, 
Case No. 20040499CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction on one count of 
possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine), a third 
degree felony (R. 218-20). This court has jurisdiction over the 
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e)(West 2004). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Did the magistrate properly determine that the search 
warrant affidavit, when viewed in its entirety and in a common 
sense fashion, provided a substantial basis for determining that 
probable cause existed to believe drugs would be found in 
defendant's home? 
In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress a search 
warrant, the appellate court affords the magistrate "great 
deference." State v. Saddler, 2004 UT 105, 17, 104 P.3d 1265. 
The appellate court does not review the magistrate's probable 
cause determination de novo, but rather determines "whether the 
magistrate had a ^substantial basis' for determining that 
probable cause existed." State v. Norris, 2001 UT 104, 1 14, 48 
P.3d 872 (citation omitted). In making this determination, the 
court does not engage in "* [e]xcessive technical dissection of an 
informant's tip or of the nontechnical language in the officer's 
affidavit.'" Saddler, 2004 UT 105, 57 (quoting State v. Hansen, 
732 P.2d 127, 130 (Utah 1987). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not 
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized. 
U.S. Const, amend. IV. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with one count each of possession of a 
controlled substance (methamphetamine) with intent to distribute, 
a second degree felony; possession of a controlled substance 
(marijuana) with intent to distribute, possession of a controlled 
substance (methamphetamine), possession of a controlled substance 
(psilicybin mushrooms), all third degree felonies; and possession 
of drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor (R. 1-3). The 
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magistrate bound defendant over for trial, and defendant filed a 
motion to suppress, which the trial court denied (R. 20-21, 28-
31, 48-49). Defendant filed a second motion to suppress. After 
a hearing, the court denied that motion as well (R. 148-63, 169-
81 at addendum A). Defendant then entered a conditional guilty 
plea to one count of possession of a controlled substance 
(methamphetamine), a third degree felony, and the State dismissed 
the remaining charges (R. 184-89, 203-04). The trial court 
sentenced defendant to a suspended prison term of zero-to-five 
years, with 60 days in the Sanpete County jail; ordered that she 
pay a fine of $5000; and imposed various conditions (R. 219). 
Defendant moved for a certificate of probable cause, which the 
trial court granted (R. 182, 203-04). Defendant also filed a 
timely notice of appeal (R. 207-08). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS1 
Between June 19th and August 14th, 2002, members of the 
Central Utah Narcotics Task Force engaged in surveillance of the 
home defendant shared with Terry Hanks in Mount Pleasant (R. 206: 
2; R. 238-40 at addendum B). 
A citizen informant had provided officers with vehicle 
license numbers of individuals who, more than once, arrived at 
defendant's residence and then departed within 2-3 minutes (R. 
238). Of the individuals so identified, seven had convictions 
1
 The Statement of Facts is based on recitations in the 
search warrant affidavit and its supporting attachment, and in 
the presentence investigation report. 
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for possession or use of a controlled substance, either 
methamphetamine or marijuana (R. 238-39). Three identified 
persons had been arrested for or convicted of crimes of violence 
Id. In addition, more than 14 other separate vehicles had 
briefly stopped at the home during the surveillance period, some 
on more than one occasion (R. 239; R. 225: 8). 
On August 8th, officers executed a search warrant on the 
home of Gary Sorenson, one of the seven individuals with drug-
related convictions whose vehicles had been seen at defendant's 
home (R. 239). Although Sorenson was absent when the officers 
executed the warrant, they found methamphetamine and drug 
paraphernalia in his home. Id. On the following two days, 
August 9th and 10th, officers again observed Sorenson at 
defendant's home. Id. 
Four days after officers executed the warrant on Sorenson's 
home, they met with a confidential informant, who stated that 
defendant had been and was continuing to sell methamphetamine for 
Sorenson. Id. The officers deemed this information reliable 
because the confidential informant had previously given accurate 
information to law enforcement (R. 236 at addendum C). Further, 
the information dovetailed with the report of a third informant, 
who reported personal knowledge that defendant was selling 
methamphetamine for Sorenson (R. 239). This informant reported 
seeing defendant pick up methamphetamine from Sorenson's 
residence on more than one occasion. JcL. 
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Based on this information, officers obtained a daytime no-
knock search warrant and executed it on defendant's home (R. 242-
43 at addendum D). They discovered marijuana and drug 
paraphernalia in plain view as well as large quantities of 
marijuana, methamphetamine, psilocybin mushrooms, and 
paraphernalia suitable for packaging drugs (R. 206: 3). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Applying a probable cause analysis that the Utah Supreme 
Court has since disavowed, defendant argues that the trial court 
should have granted her suppression motion because the magistrate 
issued a search warrant for her home without sufficient probable 
cause to believe contraband would be found there. She contends 
that the affidavit was insufficient because the facts were not 
sufficiently detailed, the information was undated, the 
informants were unnamed, and the police failed to corroborate 
any of the information. See Br. of Aplt. at 12-13. 
Under the correct totality of the circumstances test, the 
magistrate's probable cause determination should be affirmed. 
First, a citizen informant, whose reliability may be presumed, 
provided information based on personal knowledge about short-term 
traffic at defendant's home that was consistent with an on-going 
drug sales operation. Second, police conducted surveillance on 
the home, and ran license plate and criminal history checks on 
the short-term traffic they observed. The training and 
experience of the officers suggested that the short-term traffic 
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was likely indicative of drug transactions occurring within the 
home, and the criminal history checks corroborated that multiple 
individuals with drug-related histories were briefly and 
repeatedly stopping at the home. Third, a confidential informant 
who had previously provided accurate information to the police 
reported that defendant had been and was continuing to sell drugs 
for another individual whose home the police had recently 
searched pursuant to a warrant and where drugs and paraphernalia 
suggesting trafficking had been found. 
When all this information is considered together, the 
practical, common-sense conclusion is that the magistrate had a 
substantial basis upon which to conclude that a fair probability 
existed that contraband would be found in defendant's home. No 
more is necessary to satisfy the Fourth Amendment. 
ARGUMENT 
THE MAGISTRATE PROPERLY ISSUED THE 
SEARCH WARRANT WHERE THE AFFIDAVIT, 
WHEN VIEWED IN ITS ENTIRETY AND IN 
A COMMON SENSE FASHION, PROVIDED A 
SUBSTANTIAL BASIS FOR DETERMINING 
THAT PROBABLE CAUSE EXISTED TO 
BELIEVE DRUGS WOULD BE FOUND IN 
DEFENDANT'S HOME 
Defendant contends that the trial court should have granted 
her suppression motion because the magistrate issued a search 
warrant for her home without sufficient probable cause to believe 
drugs would be found there.2 She bases her argument on the 
2
 Defendant also briefly argues that the magistrate had an 
insufficient basis upon which to issue a no-knock warrant. See 
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three-prong test for probable cause articulated in Kavsville City 
v. Mulcahv, 943 P.2d 231 (Utah App. 1997), subsequently 
interpreted as mandatory in State v. Valenzuela, 2001 UT App 332, 
37 P.3d 260 and State v. Deluna, 2001 UT App 401, 40 P.3d 1136, 
and most recently applied in State v. Saddler, 2003 UT App 82, 67 
P.3d 1025, rev'd on cert,, 2005 UT 105, 104 P.3d 1265, and State 
v. Dable, 2003 UT App 389, 81 P.3d 783.3 See Br. of Aplt. at 16-
18, 21, 22-23. 
Br. of Aplt. at 31-32. Although defendant raised this issue in 
her suppression motion, the trial court did not rule on it and 
defendant failed to invoke a ruling on it. See R. 36, 42; R. 
169-81 at addendum A. Even assuming that defendant properly 
preserved the issue, however, her briefing is inadequate. She 
argues that the no-knock warrant was issued solely because one of 
the individuals observed stopping at the home had an assault 
conviction. See Br. of Aplt. at 31. Defendant, however, wholly 
ignores the reasons for requesting no-knock authorization 
articulated in the search warrant. These included the "history 
of violence ranging from assault to weapons and concealed weapons 
violations" of several of the documented repeat visitors to the 
home, as well as the officers' articulated training and 
experience in executing search warrants for drugs. R. 243 at 
addendum D; R. 241 at addendum E. Defendant's argument of less 
than one page is inadequate because it fails to apply the law to 
all of the facts. Consequently, this Court should decline to 
consider it. See, e.g., State v. Gomez, 2002 UT 120, 529, 63 
P.3d 72 (declining to address issue where no legal analysis 
except conclusory statement that defendant was entitled to 
relief); Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9) & (j)(articulating requirement 
for legal argumentation and providing for exclusion of matters 
not presented in compliance with rule). 
3
 The three-prong test mandates consideration of: l)the 
reliability of the informant; 2)the extent of the detailed 
information provided by the informant; and 3)whether the police 
personally corroborated the informant's tip. State v. Saddler, 
2004 UT 105, 118 (citing Kavsville City v. Mulcahv, 943 P.2d at 
235-36). 
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At the outset, since defendant filed her brief, the law upon 
which she relied has been clarified by the Utah Supreme Court. 
See State v. Saddler, 2004 UT 105, 104 P.3d 1265. Considering 
the case on certiorari review, the supreme court rejected the 
"exacting" and "technical" three-factor analysis for assessing 
probable cause articulated in Mulcahy and its progeny and 
reiterated its endorsement of the more flexible "totality of the 
circumstances" test articulated in Illinois v. Gates, 4 62 U.S. 
213 (1983). Saddler, 2004 UT 105 at 515110-11. Under Gates, the 
three factors are still relevant. However, 
[t]hey are not strict, independent 
requirements to be "rigidly exacted" in every 
case. A weakness in one or the other is not 
fatal to the warrant so long as in the 
totality there is substantial basis to find 
probable cause. The indicia of veracity, 
reliability, and basis of knowledge are 
nonexclusive elements to be evaluated in 
reaching the practical, common-sense decision 
whether, given all the circumstances, there 
is a fair probability that the contraband 
will be found in the place described. 
Saddler, 2004 UT 105, 511 (quoting State v. Hansen, 732 P.2d 127, 
130 (Utah 1997)(quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 233-34)). 
In this case, the district court issued a lengthy memorandum 
decision, detailing its reasons for denying defendant's 
suppression motion and affirming the magistrate's determination 
that probable cause sufficiently supported the search warrant. 
See R. 169-81 at Addendum A. Although issuing its decision 
almost ten months before the Utah Supreme Court's Saddler 
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opinion, the district court presciently — and with startling 
accuracy — tracked the supreme court's reasoning in Saddler. 
The district court first addressed the difficulty of 
squaring this Court's Saddler opinion with Illinois v. Gates (R. 
169). After briefly reviewing the history of the Fourth 
Amendment, including various models for assessing probable cause, 
the court noted that Gates' reaffirmation of the totality of the 
circumstances test grew out of a line of lower court cases that 
had strayed from the proper test. These cases had calcified what 
were originally guidelines for a magistrate's assessment of 
probable cause into inflexible and independent requirements for 
probable cause (R. 172). Likewise, the Utah cases on which 
defendant relied in her suppression motion, while reciting the 
Gates totality of the circumstances test, in fact applied a more 
rigid set of requirements. The district court observed, "[W]hat 
began as helpful analytical tools eventually developed a life 
[sic] of their own and reached mandatory status" (R. 173). These 
cases, the court concluded, evidenced "an analytical approach 
somewhat akin to that rejected in Gates" (R. 173) . 
Quoting extensively from the Gates rationale, buttressed by 
language from the Utah Supreme Court's opinion in State v. 
Hansen, 732 P.2d 127 (Utah 1987), the district court then 
reaffirmed the necessity of analyzing probable cause in a common 
sense, non-technical, reasonable manner, consistent with the 
practical reality that search warrant affidavits are prepared by 
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individuals who are neither judges nor lawyers (R. 176-78). The 
court explained its role in reviewing the magistrate's 
determination: 
[TJhe end objective is to determine if the 
magistrate who viewed the affidavit in that 
manner [i.e. in a non-technical, common sense 
manner through the eyes of a layman] had a 
"substantial basis for . . . , [concluding] 
that a search warrant would uncover evidence 
of wrongdoing," Gates at 236, or that there 
was "a fair probability that contraband or 
evidence of a crime . . . [would] be found in 
a particular place." Gates at 238; accord 
Hansen at 130. I further avoid a "technical 
dissection of an informant's tip or of the 
nontechnical language in the officer's 
affidavit," the same being "ill-suited to the 
task" of a common sense analysis and 
construction. Id. 
R. 178. 
Having thus articulated the applicable law, the district 
court then applied it, determining that the information supplied 
by the police in the affidavit was unchallenged; that the citizen 
informant's information may be presumed valid; and that the 
confidential informant's veracity was bolstered both by the 
testimony of the citizen informant and by her previously 
providing the police with accurate information (R. 178-79) . 
Considering the totality of these facts and applying a common 
sense approach, the court concluded that the magistrate had "a 
^substantial basis for . . . [concluding]' that there was a ^fair 
probability that contraband or evidence of a crime . . . [would] 
be found' at [defendant's] residence, or *that a search would 
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uncover evidence of wrongdoing'" (R. 180 (citations omitted)).4 
On appeal, defendant attacks the confidential informant's 
reliability and veracity. See Br. of Aplt. at 19-23. Officers 
met with this informant on August 12th, four days after executing 
a warrant on the home of a convicted drug dealer, Gary Sorenson, 
in whose home officers had found quantities of drugs and 
paraphernalia suggesting trafficking, and just two days after 
observing Sorenson making yet another brief stop at defendant's 
home (R. 239) .5 The informant told officers that defendant had 
4
 The court's decision does, however, incorrectly combine 
the statements of two informants. The search warrant affidavit 
refers to the first and third informants as citizen informants. 
See Aff. at 2. At the suppression hearing, however, the State 
clarified that the third informant's reliability should not be 
presumed, as would be typical with a citizen informant, because 
she provided the information only after police had arrested and 
incarcerated her. See R. 225 at 4-5 at addendum B. The district 
court's memorandum decision incorrectly merges the information 
provided by the first and third informants, presuming reliability 
for all of it. See R. 179 at addendum A. The brief of appellant 
confuses the facts in a different way. There, both the first and 
third informants are referred to as citizen informants and the 
second informant, who was a confidential informant, is referred 
to as a criminal informant. Br. of Aplt. at 20. 
5
 There was also a third informant, characterized in the 
affidavit as another "citizen informant." At the suppression 
hearing, the State clarified that this so-called citizen 
informant spoke to the police only after she had been arrested 
and incarcerated and that her statement should not be subject to 
the presumption of reliability or veracity typically attaching to 
a citizen informant. See R. 225: 4-5 at addendum F; State v. 
Deluna, 2001 UT App 401, 514, 40 P.3d 1136, 1140 (citations 
omitted). This informant told the police that she had personally 
seen defendant at Sorenson' s home picking up methamphetamine more 
than once, and that she had personal knowledge that defendant was 
selling methamphetamine for Sorenson (R. 239 at addendum B). The 
State does not rely on the information she provided to justify 
issuance of the warrant. 
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been selling quantities of methamphetamine for Gary Sorenson and 
was still continuing to do so (R. 242-43 at addendum D). As 
noted in the affidavit, this informant had previously worked with 
Officer Thomas and had provided him with accurate information. 
See State v. Hansen, 732 P.2d at 130 (informant's past history of 
supplying police with truthful information constitutes accepted 
method for establishing informant veracity)(citations omitted). 
Defendant's further contention that the informant was necessarily 
unreliable because his name was not disclosed is similarly 
without merit.6 See Br. of Aplt. at 22-23. Officer Thomas 
asserted in his search warrant affidavit that the confidential 
informant had previously given him accurate information (R. 236 
at addendum C). While the affidavit did not unambiguously state 
that Thomas knew the informant's name, the magistrate could 
reasonably have inferred that since the affiant and the informant 
had a history of successfully working together, the officer knew 
the informant's identity. On review, this Court defers to the 
magistrate's reasonable construction of ambiguous language in an 
affidavit. State v. Babbell, 770 P.2d 987, 992 (Utah 1989). 
6
 Defendant also notes that the information did not come 
directly to the affiant from the confidential informant. See Br. 
of Aplt. at 20. Although neither of the officers with whom the 
confidential informant met drafted the affidavit, affiant Thomas, 
a fellow law enforcement officer, was entitled to rely on the 
information they gave him. See State v. Dorsey, 731 P.2d 1085, 
1088 (Utah 1986) (in making probable cause determination, police 
officer can rely on information gained from other police 
officers). 
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Defendant also argues that the affidavit fails to include 
"any relevant time periods'7 and, consequently, that MAthere is no 
way to determine whether the information is stale.'" Br. of Aplt. 
at 29 (citation omitted). "A mere passage of time[, however,] 
does not necessarily invalidate the supporting basis for the 
warrant." State v. Hansen, 732 P.2d at 131. In this case, the 
pattern of short-stay visits Sorenson made to defendant's home 
occurred over a specified two-month period, culminating in the 
issuance of the warrant. These visits continued unabated even 
after officers had executed a warrant on Sorenson's home and 
found contraband indicative of drug dealing there. Such evidence 
strongly suggests the ongoing nature of an unlawful enterprise. 
See State v. Anderton, 668 P.2d 1258, 1261 (Utah 1983) (common 
sense reading of affidavit suggested continuing nature of 
presence of drugs). 
The search warrant was further supported by the information 
provided by a citizen informant. This informant personally 
reported to affiant Thomas that, since June 19th, he had observed 
a lot of short-term traffic at defendant's home, coming and going 
within two to three minutes (R. 238 at addendum B). This 
informant had personal knowledge of individuals visiting the home 
and provided Thomas with license numbers of vehicles, some of 
which had made multiple brief stops at the residence (Id.). He 
had a strong basis of knowledge because his information was based 
on personal observations of the traffic at defendant's home and 
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because he personally knew some of the individuals involved. 
Notably, this informant provided no information about drug-
dealing. His observations were limited to a particular kind of 
traffic at defendant's home. 
As to the reliability of the citizen informant, "an ordinary 
citizen-informant needs no independent proof of reliability or 
veracity." State v. Deluna, 2001 UT App 401, 514 (quotation and 
citation omitted). Nonetheless, the license plate number 
provided by the citizen informant for Sorenson, one of the 
individuals who made multiple stops at defendant's home, 
dovetailed with information police subsequently discovered. That 
is, the confidential informant later told police that defendant 
was selling methamphetamine for Sorenson, and the officers 
themselves later discovered drugs and paraphernalia at Sorenson's 
home (R. 239). 
Members of the Central Utah Narcotics Task Force 
corroborated the information provided by the citizen informant 
by working the case from June 19th until the warrant was issued 
and executed on August 14th (R. 236, 238). By conducting 
surveillance, they confirmed the short-stay activity at 
defendant's home. They ran license numbers provided by the 
citizen informant, identified vehicle owners, and ran criminal 
history checks. They identified eight individuals with 
significant criminal histories, all of whom had been charged with 
drug crimes and seven of whom had at least one drug conviction. 
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Two of the eight had also been charged with domestic violence. A 
third had an assault conviction, and a fourth had a conviction 
for escape from official custody (R. 238-39). 
Task force members attested that in their collective 
experience, the activity they noted at defendant's home was 
"consistent with the distribution of controlled substances" (R. 
239). Such corroboration bolsters the probable cause 
determination. See State v. Purser, 828 P.2d 515, 516, 518 (Utah 
App. 1992) (concluding that where detective "described his 
narcotics experience" and observed short-terms stays at 
defendant's residence "suggesting narcotics trafficking," such 
corroboration supports probable cause finding); accord State v. 
White, 851 P.2d 1195, 1196-97 (Utah App. 1993). 
Under these circumstances, applying common sense and 
omitting the information provided by the second "citizen 
informant," the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding 
there was a fair probability that defendant was dealing drugs 
from her home and that controlled substances would be found 
there. Because the Fourth Amendment requires no more than this, 
this Court should affirm the magistrate's issuance of the search 
warrant and the trial court's denial of defendant's suppression 
motion. See, e.g., Gates, 462 U.S. at 238-39 ("[T]he duty of a 
reviewing court is simply to ensure that the magistrate had a 
^substantial basis for . . . conclud[ing]' that probable cause 
existed") (citation omitted)) . 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm defendant's 
convictions for one count each of burglary, a second degree 
felony, and theft, a class B misdemeanor. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this ff'day of June, 2005. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
c 
JOANNE C. SLOTNIK 
Assistant Attorney General 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that two true and accurate copies of the 
foregoing brief of appellee were mailed first-class, postage 
prepaid, to Shelden R. Carter, attorney for appellant, 3325 North 
University, Suite 200, Provo, Utah 84604, this fficiay of June, 
2005. 
_C 
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Addenda 
Addendum A 
DISTRICT COURT, SANPETE COUMTy^yTAH-" 
160 North Main 
Manti, Utah 84642 
Telephone: 435-835-2131 Fax: 435-835-2135 
1 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
PAULA POULSON, 
Defendant. 
i 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Case No. 021600147 
Assigned Judge K. L. McIFF 
INTRODUCTION 
Defendant comes before the court a second time seeking suppression of evidence seized 
from her personal residence pursuant to a search warrant. Defendant challenges the sufficiency 
of the supporting affidavit and places reliance on two recent decisions of the court of appeals, 
State v. Saddler, 67 P.3d 1025 (Utah App. 2003) and State v. Dable, 486 Utah Adv. Rep. 49 
(Utah App. 11/14/03). I am having some difficulty squaring the analytical approach in these 
decisions with their claimed source, and with the landmark decision of the United States 
Supreme Court in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983). For that reason, the legal analysis 
which follows takes a slightly different track. 
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LEGAL ANALYSIS 
I begin with the observation that the right which is entitled to protection in this and 
similar cases, has its origin in the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and is 
stated in remarkably few words: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrant shall issue, but 
upon probable cause,.... [Emphasis added]. 
During the two hundred plus years that the Amendment has been in force, courts have 
faced the challenge of giving substantive meaning to the simple words "unreasonable searches 
and seizures" and "probable cause". In the beginning and for well in excess of a hundred years, 
the effort tended to be more academic because the stakes were not so high. Frequently there 
were no practical consequences flowing from a Fourth Amendment violation. All of that 
changed with adoption of the so-called "exclusionary rule." Beginning in 1914 with the decision 
in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment could not be used in federal court criminal proceedings against the victim of the 
illegal search. This prohibition was extended to state court proceedings in the 1961 decision in 
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643. These decisions raised the stakes. Demonstration of probable 
cause within affidavits supporting search warrants and review of those affidavits for 
constitutional compliance became all important. 
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The foregoing is, of course, elementary. It is recited only for the purpose of setting the 
stage for review of how courts have dealt with probable cause determinations. During the years 
following Weeks and Mapp, courts developed various analytical models to apply the overarching 
constitutional principles. The general tendency has been to develop mechanical formulas which 
employ multi-prong tests, and examine the affidavits in piecemeal fashion. Not infrequently 
these formulas originated as guidelines or analytical tools, only later to reach the status of 
mandatory prerequisites. Experience teaches that once developed and cited repeatedly in 
succeeding cases, mechanical formulas or approaches can take on a life of their own so that 
principles are swallowed up by prongs and fundamental rights become subservient to the rules 
designed to give them substance. In this process it has been, and remains, all too easy to become 
so focused on the individual pieces that the overall mosaic becomes a blur. 
That is precisely where Fourth Amendment jurisprudence stood in 1983 when the 
Supreme Court of the United States decided Illinois v. Gates, supra. Prior to Gates, there had 
developed a "two-pronged test" known as Aguilar - Spinelli. It derived from two supreme court 
decisions, Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964) and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 
(1969). As applied by lower courts, this test required that both prongs be satisfied independent 
of the other. As one frequently cited decision stated, "[T]he dual requirements represented by the 
'two-pronged test' are 'analytically severable' and an 'overkill' on one prong will not carry over 
to make up for a deficit on the other prong." Stanley v. State, 313 A.2d 847, 861 (Md. App. 
i n i 
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1974); cited in Gates at 230 n.5. The excessively mechanical, complex and straight-jacket 
approach which had developed among the various lower courts, including the Illinois Supreme 
Court (which decided Gates below) is exemplified in the following language from Gates: 
In summary, these rules posit that the 'veracity' prong of the Spinelli test has two 'spurs' 
- the informant's 'credibility' and the 'reliability' of his information. Various 
interpretations are advanced for the meaning of the 'reliability' spur of the 'veracity' 
prong. Both the "basis of knowledge" prong and the "veracity" prong are treated as 
entirely separate requirements, which must be independently satisfied in every case in 
order to sustain a determination of probable cause. 462 U.S. at 229, n.4. 
Critical of this approach, the Gates court stated that "the direction taken by decisions 
following Spinelli poorly serves the most basic function of any government." Id. at 237. It 
concluded "that it is wiser to abandon the two-pronged tes t . . . and to reaffirm the totality-of-the-
circumstances analysis that traditionally has informed probable-cause determinations." At 238. 
Moreover, it noted that its "original phrasing of the so called 'two-pronged test' in Aguilar . . . 
suggests that the two prongs were intended simply as guides to a magistrate's determination of 
probable cause, not as inflexible, independent requirements applicable in every case . . . . " At 232. 
[Emphasis added.] With regard to the Aguilar - Spinelli elements, it stated, "[T]hey are better 
understood as relevant considerations in the totality of the circumstances analysis that 
traditionally has guided probable-cause determinations: a deficiency in one may be compensated 
for in determining the overall reliability of a tip, by a strong showing as to the other, or by some 
other indicia of reliability." At 233. 
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The foregoing serves as a backdrop for examining the Saddler and Dable court of appeals 
decisions on which defendant places principle reliance. In the end both Saddler and Dable 
recognize that the totality-of-the-circumstances test is controlling, but each contains an analytical 
approach somewhat akin to that rejected in Gates. Saddler and Dable claim that this approach is 
mandated by Kaysville City v. Mulcahy, 943 P.2d 231 (Ut. App. 1997). No where does Mulcahy 
suggest that it is establishing a mandatory analytical formula. The three factors considered by the 
Mulcahy court do not appear to have been considered essential by it, but rather helpful factors 
which the court "gleaned from prior Utah cases," 943 P.2d at 235. The court went on to state, 
"we supplement and clarify our analysis with pertinent principles from the numerous other states 
addressing facts more on point. . . ." (Id). Mulcahy then cited some 20 cases from all across 
the United States. What flowed from Mulcahy is similar to what happened with Aguilar and 
Spinelli. What began as helpful analytical tools eventually developed a life of their own and 
reached mandatory status. With respect to the Mulcahy factors, the transition occurred in the 
subsequent case of State v. Valensuela, 37 P.3d 260 (Ut. App. 2001). After reviewing Mulcahy, 
the Valensuela court quotes this language: "Thus, we articulated 'three factors [a court must] 
consider in determining the reliability and sufficiency of the informant's 'report' " Id. at 263. 
[Emphasis added, but including only the court's words ] With the simple insertion of the 
bracketed language, helpful guides became mandatory obligations. The transition was complete 
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without any discussion and subsequently reinforced in State v. Deluna, 40 P.3d 1136 (Ut. App. 
2001) and again in Saddler and Dable} 
The two-pronged test of Aguilar and Spinelli required that the affidavit (1) reveal the 
informant's "basis of knowledge" and (2) provide sufficient facts to establish the informant's 
"veracity" or the "reliability" of the informant's report. Under Gates, neither of these is now 
considered mandatory. Such is acknowledged in numerous Utah cases including Saddler. 
However, the first mandatory Saddler factor tracks the Aguilar and Spinelli test, combining basis 
of knowledge with veracity and reliability. The Saddler court found the affidavit in question 
satisfied the "basis of knowledge" requirement, but failed to establish "veracity" or "reliability". 
It is difficult to distinguish the court's treatment and application of the first Mulcahy factor from 
the Aguilar-Spinelh test.2 Saddler prompted a strong dissent which expressed the view that the 
majority had afforded very little deference to the determination made by the magistrate, had paid 
only lip service to the totality-of-the-circumstances standard required by Gates and had applied 
the older and stricter Aguilar - Spinelli test. At best, the elevation of each of the Mulcahy factors 
It may be important to note thztMulcahy involved a single issue of whether reasonable suspicion existed 
to support the police in stopping and detaining a motorist based upon an informant's tip. It was in that context that 
the court of appeals employed an analysis which relied upon three factors. The later cases overlaid these factors on 
search warrant probable cause determinations by magistrates and made them mandatory. 
Some may argue that the cases stemming fromMulcahy require only that the three factors be considered 
as opposed to satisfied, but that is not the manner in whichSaddler treats the first factor. 
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to mandatory status and the manner of their employment in Saddler raises serious question as to 
its harmony with Gates? 
In light of the foregoing, and before reaching the affidavit supporting the search warrant 
in this case, I consider it appropriate to outline in brief terms the law that is clearly appUcable and 
concerning which no one should object. Gates reversed a trend that had developed over many 
years. That trend had produced a mechanical and somewhat rigid approach which encouraged 
focusing on the individual pieces rather than the overall mosaic. Gates adopted a "big-picture" 
approach. What had previously been considered as "strict prerequisites for establishing probable 
cause" instead became "relevant considerations" under the "totality-of-the-circumstances-test." 
During the year of its publication, Gates was endorsed by the Utah Supreme Court in State v. 
Anderton, 668 P.2d 1258 (Utah 1983). Every known Utah precedent since then has continued to 
endorse the Gates test including both Saddler and Dable. For that reason, direct reliance on 
Gates should be safe ground for this court. 
Gates still dictates how reviewing courts should evaluate affidavits in support of search 
warrants. At the expense of brevity, but wanting the philosophical underpinning to be clear, I 
It must be remembered that Gates involved an anonymous letter. There was no "face to face", no way to 
evaluate the basis of knowledge, and no way to establish veracity or reliability except through confirmation by police 
observations. Even then, the confirmations did not establish any wrongdoing. They were limited to confirming that 
the anonymous letter's information about the travels of a husband and wife on an alleged trip to acquire illegal 
controlled substances was accurate. 
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have cited hereafter relevant language from the Gates decision. The internal citations, and there 
are many, have been omitted to aid the flow. Gates is adequate support for the concepts. 
[SJearch and arrest warrants long have been issued by persons who are neither lawyers 
nor judges, and who certainly do not remain abreast of each judicial refinement of the 
nature of "probable cause." The rigorous inquiry into the Spinelli prongs and the 
complex superstructure of evidentiary and analytical rules that some have seen implicit in 
our Spinelli decision, cannot be reconciled with the fact that many warrants are - quite 
properly - issued on the basis of nontechnical, common-sense judgments of laymen 
applying a standard less demanding than those used in more formal legal proceedings. At 
235-36. 
[W]e have repeatedly said that after-the-fact scrutiny by courts of the sufficiency of an 
affidavit should not take the form of de novo review. A magistrate's "determination of 
probable cause should be paid great deference by reviewing courts." "A grudging or 
negative attitude by reviewing courts toward warrants is inconsistent with the Fourth 
Amendment's strong preference for searches conducted pursuant to a warrant; "courts 
should not invalidate [warrants] by interpreting [affidavits] in a hypertechnical, rather 
than a commonsense, manner." At 236. 
Reflecting this preference for the warrant process, the traditional standard for review of 
an issuing magistrate's probable-cause determination has been that so long as the 
magistrate had a "substantial basis for . . . [concluding]" that a search would uncover 
evidence of wrongdoing, the Fourth Amendment requires no more. We think 
reaffirmation of this standard better serves the purpose of encouraging recourse to the 
warrant procedure and is more consistent with our traditional deference to the probable-
cause determinations of magistrates than is the "two-pronged test." At 236-37. 
We also have said that "[although] in a particular case it may not be easy to determine 
when an affidavit demonstrates the existence of probable cause, the resolution of doubtful 
or marginal cases in this area should be largely determined by the preference to be 
accorded to warrants." This reflects both a desire to encourage use of the warrant process 
by police officers and a recognition that once a warrant has been obtained, intrusion upon 
interests protected by the Fourth Amendment is less severe than otherwise may be the 
case. At 237. 
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The strictures that inevitably accompany the "two-pronged test" cannot avoid seriously 
impeding the task of law enforcement. If.. . that test must be rigorously applied in every 
case, anonymous tips would be of greatly diminished value in police work. Ordinary 
citizens . . . do not provide extensive recitations of the basis of their everyday 
observations... [T]he veracity of persons supplying anonymous tips is by hypothesis 
largely unknown, and unknowable. As a result, anonymous tips seldom could survive a 
rigorous application of either of the Spinelli prongs. Yet, such tips, particularly when 
supplemented by independent police investigation, frequently contribute to the solution of 
otherwise "perfect crimes." While a conscientious assessment of the basis for crediting 
such tips is required by the Fourth Amendment, a standard that leaves virtually no place 
for anonymous citizen informants is not. At 237-38. 
For all these reasons, we conclude that it is wiser to abandon the "two-pronged test" 
established by our decisions in Aguilar and Spinelli. In its place we reaffirm the totality-
of-the-circumstances analysis that traditionally has informed probable-cause 
determinations. The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, 
common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit 
before him, including the "veracity" and "basis of knowledge" of persons supplying 
hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will 
be found in a particular place. And the duty of a reviewing court is simply to ensure that 
the magistrate had a "substantial basis for . . . [concluding]" that probable cause existed. 
At 238-39. 
The language from the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Hansen, 732 P.2d 127, 130 (Utah 
1987), though abbreviated, embraces the same concepts and relies heavily on Gates: 
Search warrant affidavits are to be construed in a common-sense, reasonable manner. 
State v. Williamson, 674. P.2d 132, 133 (Utahl983); State v. Purcell, 586 P.2d 441 (Utah 
1978). Excessive technical dissection of an informant's tip or of the nontechnical 
language in the officer's affidavit is ill-suited to this task. 462 U.S. at 231-32, 235-36, 
103 S.Ct. At 2328-30, 2330-31. In Gates, the Supreme Court emphasized that an 
informant's "reliability" and "basis of knowledge" are but two relevant considerations, 
among others, in determining the existence of probable cause under "a totality-of-the-
circumstances." 462 U.S. at 233-34, 103 S.Ct. At 2329-30. They are not strict, 
independent requirements to be "rigidly exacted" in every case. A weakness in one or the 
other is not fatal to the warrant so long as in the totality there is substantial basis to find 
probable cause. Id. at 230, 238, 103 S.Ct. at 2328, 2332. The indicia of veracity, 
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reliability, and basis of knowledge are nonexclusive elements to be evaluated in reaching 
the practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances, there is a fair 
probability that the contraband will be found in the place described. 
With the foregoing legal framework in place, I will now proceed to consider the affidavit 
supporting the search warrant in this case and the factual picture it created. Consistent with the 
language of Gates, and the concepts embraced by Hansen, I read it in a nontechnical common-
sense manner through the eyes of a layman, not with a grudging or negative attitude but 
recognizing a strong preference for searches conducted pursuant to warrant. The end objective is 
to determine if the magistrate who viewed the affidavit in that manner had a "substantial basis for 
. . . [concluding] that a search warrant would uncover evidence of wrongdoing," Gates at 236, or 
that there was "a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime . . . [would] be found in a 
particular place." Gates at 238; accord, Hansen at 130. I further avoid a "technical dissection of 
an informant's tip or of the nontechnical language in the officer's affidavit," the same being "ill-
suited to the task" of a common sense analysis and construction. Id. [Emphasis added.] 
As gleaned from the affidavit, the investigation conducted by the detectives of the Central 
Utah Narcotics Task Force covered less than 2 months, commencing on June 19, 2002 and 
ending with the issuance of the search warrant on August 14,2002. The affidavit contained 
information from three sources; a citizen informant, police investigation and a confidential 
informant. Defendant does not challenge the information supplied by the police and is obliged to 
recognize that the information from the citizen informant is presumed valid and needs no 
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independent proof of reliability or veracity. Mulcahy at 235; State v. Deluna, 40 P.3d 1136,1140 
(Utah App. 2001). The veracity of the confidential informant was buttressed in two ways. First, 
it was corroborated by its consistency with the information received from the citizen informant. 
Second, the confidential informant had in the past given information to the Task Force detective 
which proved accurate. That is an accepted method for establishing an informant's veracity. 
Hansen, at 130; citing State v. Bailey, 675 P.2d 1203,1206 (Utah 1984), and McCray v. Illinois, 
386 U.S. 300 (1967). Moreover, Utah has "never required that an affidavit be so specific as to 
detail every prior occasion in which the informant's seed yielded fruit." Hansen, at 130. 
In a nut shell, the picture created for the magistrate was one where the citizen informant 
supplied personal knowledge that Paula Poulson was selling methamphetamine for one Gary 
Sorensen.4 The other facts supplied by the citizen informant suggest that the sales were being 
made out of her personal residence. The citizen informant had seen Poulson at Sorensen's 
residence more than once picking up methamphetamine. Since June 19, when the investigation 
began, the citizen informant had seen a lot of short-term traffic arriving and departing from 
Poulson's residence. The citizen informant supplied vehicle license plate numbers and personal 
knowledge of the individuals who were arriving and departing from the Poulson residence. The 
Admittedly, this is a conclusory observation, but it does not stand alone. It is supported and corroborated 
by the other facts supplied by the citizen informant and by the police investigation and the statement of a confidential 
informant. Moreover, as the Gates court observed, "Ordinary citizens do not provide extensive recitations of the 
basis of their everyday observations." At 237. Such observations should not be viewed in isolation but as part of the 
overall mix. It is the mix that must be the focus of the magistrate's evaluation. 
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officers obtained criminal histories for eight of these persons, all of whom showed arrests for 
drug related offenses with seven of the eight having been convicted of the same. In addition to 
the eight, the short-term traffic at the Poulson residence revealed fourteen other vehicles, some 
on more than one occasion. Sorensen was one of the persons specifically identified as having 
been at Poulson's residence on multiple occasions. Sorensen had previously been convicted of 
possession and distribution of methamphetamine, and a search warrant executed at Sorensen's 
residence six days before the search warrant in question had resulted in the seizure of 
methamphetamine, scales, packaging material and other paraphernalia. Sorensen was not present 
at his residence at the time of the search, but was thereafter seen at Poulson's residence on 
August 9 and August 10.5 On August 12, barely two days before issuance of the search warrant 
for Poulson's residence, the confidential informant advised the officers that Paula Poulson "has 
been and is still selling a lot of methamphetamine for Gary Sorensen." Such was consistent with 
all the other information in the affidavit and served to add an additional measure of currency. 
Considering the foregoing in its totality and applying a common-sense approach, did the 
magistrate have a "substantial basis for . . . [concluding]" that there was a "fair probability that 
contraband or evidence of a cr ime. . . [would] be found" at Poulson's residence, or "that a search 
would uncover evidence of wrongdoing?" I conclude that the answer to the question is yes. As 
5
 An arrest warrant for Sorensen had been issued after the search of his residence and was outstanding at 
this time. All of these facts were included in the supporting affidavit. 
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stated in Gates, "The Fourth Amendment requires no more." At 236. Accordingly, the motion to 
suppress is denied. 
Dated this ^ 7 
*L 
day of February, 2004, 
District Court Judge 
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Addendum B 
ATTACHMENT A AFFIDAVIT 
GROUNDS FOR ISSUANCE OF A SEARCH WARRANT 
SINCE JUNE 19TH, 2 002 I HA\E RECEIVED INFORMATION FROM A 
CITIZEN INFORMANT REGARDING A LOT OF TRAFFIC THAT IS SHORT TERM, 
ARRIVING AND DEPARTING WITHIN TWO TD THREE MINUTES AT THE RESIDENCE 
OF PAULA POULSON AND TERRY HANKS . THIS RESIDENCE IS LOCATED AT 4 80 
NORTH 100 WEST MT- PLEASANT, UTAH. DETECTIVES OF THE CENTRAL UTAH 
NARCOTICS TASK FORCE HAVE BEEN WORKING THIS CASE SINCE JUNE 19TH, 
2002. 
THE CITIZEN INFORMANT GAVE ME INFORMATION ABOUT VEHICLE 
LICENSES AND PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF INDIVIDUALS WHO HAVE BEEN GOING 
TO THIS RESIDENCE. VEHICLE LICENSES HAVE BEEN RUN ON THE STATE 
WIDE COMPUTER AND THE OWNERS OF THE VEHICLES IDENTIFIED. ALSO 
CRIMINAL HISTORIES OF THOSE SUBJECTS HAVE BEEN OBTAINED FROM THE 
STATE COMPUTER. 
THE FOLLOWING INDIVIDUALS HAVE SHOWED UP AT THIS LOCATION ON 
MORE THAN ONE OCCASION, 
1. GARY L. SORENSON D.O.B, 3-01-63 HAS BEEN ARRESTED FOR; 
A. DISTRIBUTION OF METHAMPHETAMINE CONVICTED 
B. POSSESSION OF METHAMPHETAMINE CONVICTED 
C. CARRYING A CONCEALED WEAPON 
D. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
2. JOHN C, RAMEY, D.O.B. 10-16-58 HAS BEEN ARRESTED FOR: 
A. AGGRAVATED BURGLARY 
B- NARCOTIC EQUIPMENT POSSESSION 
C. AMPHETAMINE POSSESSION 
D. ASSAULT CONVICTED 
3- KENNETH HINTON D.O.B. 12-28-74 HAS BEEN ARRESTED FOR: 
A. POSSESSION OF HALLUCINOGEN 
B. POSSESSION OF NARCOTIC EQUIPMENT 
C. POSSESSION OR USE OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE CONVICTED 
D. POSSESSION OF DRUG PARAPHERNALIA CONVICTED 
4, DAVID W. TIMMS D.O.B. 11-14-78 HAS BEEN ARRESTED FOR: 
A. DISTRIBUTION/ MANUFACTURE OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES 
B. ESCAPE FROM OFFICIAL CUSTODY CONVICTED 
C. POSS/USE OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES CONVICTED 
D. POSSESSION OF PARAPHERNALIA 
5. JESSICA L. SHELLEY D,O.B, 11-05-78 HAS BEEN ARRESTED FOR: 
A. POSSESSION OF METHAMPHETAMINE W/INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE 
B. POSSESSION OF DRUG PARAPHERNALIA 
C. POSSESSION OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES CONVICTED 
3^3 
D. POSSESSION OP DRUG PARAPHERNALIA CONVTCTED 
E- JESSICA IS CURRENTLY AWAITING TRIAL FOR 2 COUNTS 
DISTRIBUTION OF METHAMPHETAM.INE. 
6. ALLEN P. STEVENS D-O.B. 6-30-65 HAS BEEN ARRESTED FOR: 
A. POSSESSION OF MARIJUANA CONVICTED 
B. DOMESTIC ASSAULT 
7. CHESLEY L. CHRISTENSEN D.O.B. 7-13-65 HAS BEEN ARRESTED 
FOR-: 
A. POSSESSION AND USE OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES CONVICTED 
B. POSSESSION WITH INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE 
C. POSSESSION OF MARIJUANA 
D. POSSESSION OF METHAMPHETAMINE 
E. CHESLEY WAS ON FELONY PROBATION UNTIL 9-17-01 
8. TERRY A. HANKS D.O.B. 10 -2. -3 -4 6 (A CO-HABITANT OF THIS 
RESIDENCE WITH PAULA POULSON) HAS BEEN ARRESTED FOR: 
A. POSSESSION OF MARIJUANA CONVICTED 
IN ADDITION TO THE NAMES LISTED ABOVE MORE THAN 14 OTHER 
SEPARATE VEHICLES HAVE ARRIVED AT THIS RESIDENCE AT DIFFERENT TIMES 
AND DATES, SOME OF THEM ON MORE THAN ONE OCCASION. 
IT IS THE EXPERIENCE AND TRAINING OF DETECTIVES OF THE TASK 
FORCE THAT THIS ACTIVITY IS CONSISTENT WITH THE DISTRIBUTION OF 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES. 
ON 8-12-02 DETECTIVES JENKINS AND WHATCOTT MET WITH A 
CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT. THE INFORMANT STATED THAT PAULA POULSON 
HAS 3EEN AND IS STILL SELLING A LOT OF METHAMPHETAMINE FOR GARY 
SORENSON. 
YOUR AFFIANT FEELS THIS INFORMATION IS RELIABLE FROM THIS 
INFORMANT BECAUSE THIS COINCIDES WETH INFORMATION THAT DETECTIVES 
THOMAS AND EKKER RECEIVED FROM A CITIZEN INFORMANT. THE CITIZEN 
INFO]*MANT TOLD DETECTIVES THAT THE "INFORMANT HAS SEEN PAULA POULSON 
AT GARY SORENSON'S RESIDENCE MORE THAN ONCE PICKING UP 
METHAMPHETAMINE. THE CITIZEN INFORMANT HAS PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE THAT 
PAULA IS SELLING THE METHAMPHETAMINE FOR GARY SORENSON. 
ON 8-9-02 DETECTIVES FROM THE CENTRAL UTAH NARCTICS TASK FORCE 
AMONG OTHER OFFICERS EXECUTED A SEARCH WARRANT AT GARY SORENSON'S 
RESIDENCE. FOUND AT THIS RESIDENCE WERE METHAMPHETAMINE, SCALES, 
PACKAGING MATERIAL, OWE SHEETS PARAPHERNALIA I.E. GLASS PIPES FOR 
METH AND MARIJUANA. GARY SORENSON WAS NOT AT THE RESIDENCE AT THAT 
TIME. GARY SORENSON HAS BEEN SEEN AT PAULA POULSON'S RESIDENCE ON 
8-9-02 AND 8-10-02. THERE IS CURRSNTLY AN ARREST WARRANT OUT FOR 
GARY SORENSON. 
YOUR AFFIANT THEREFORE PRAYS A SEARCH WARRANT BE GRANTED FOR 
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THE RESIDENCE OF PAULA POULSON LOCATED AT 480 NORTH 100 WEST MT. 
PLEASANT, UTAH. TO INCLUDE THE HOUSE, ANY OUTBUILDING, PERSONS AND 
VEHICLES THAT ARE AT THE RESIDENCE AT THE TIME THE SEARCH WARRANT 
IS EXECUTED. WE ALSO ASK TO SEARCH FOR EVIDENCE IN ANY COMPUTER AT 
THIS RESIDENCE. THE COMPUTER AND ANY DIGITAL STORAGE MEDIA THAT 
WOULD INCLUDE BUT NOT LIMITED TO 3X5 FLOPPY DISKS, ZIP DISKS AND CD 
ROMS AND ANY DEVICE THAT CAN BE CONNECTED TO THE INTERNET. THE 
PURPOSE FOR THIS IS THAT COMPUTERS ARE OFTEN FOUND IN HOMES, THAT 
INFORMATION SUCH AS OWE SHEETS, NAMES AND ADDRESSES CAN BE STORED 
HERE. ALSO THERE CAN BE PHOTOS THAT CAN IDENTIFY SUBJECTS. WE 
ALSO ASK TO SEARCH E-MAILS FOR CORRESPONDENCE PERTAINING TO 
PURC.-iASE AND SALES OF METHAMPHETAMINE, BILLS OWING AND BILLS PAID. 
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Addendum C 
IN THE 6TH DISTRICT COURT, COUNTY OP SANPETE 
STATE OP UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SANPETE ) 
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT 
BEFCRE THE HONORABLE JUDGE PAUL LYMAN 
The undersigned, being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
That affiant has reason to believe that 
(X ) on the premises known as 48 0 NORTH 100 WEST, MT. 
PLEASANT, UTAH THE RESIDENCE HAS WOOD SIDING SOME WHITE SOME 
BROWN, CHARCOAL COLORED ROOF, MAIN ENTRANCE FACES SOUTH. ALSO A 
WEST FACING DOOR ON THE NORTH END OF THE HOUSE. 
(X) in the vehicle (s) described as ANY VEHICLES AT THE 
RESIDENCE AT THE TIME OF THE EXECUTION OF THIS WARRANT. In the 
City of MT. PLEASANT, County of SANPETE, State of Utah, there is 
now certain property or evidence described as: 
METHAMPHETAMINE, PARAPHERNALIA TO CONSUME METHAMPHETAMINE, 
OWE SHEETS, PAPERS OR DOCUMENTS TO SHOW LEGAL OWNERSHIP OF THE 
HOME, SCALES AND PACKAGING MATERIAL. COMPUTER AND ANY DIGITAL 
STORAGE MEDIA THAT WOULD INCLUDE 3UT NOT LIMITED TO 3X5 FLOPPY 
DISKS, ZIP DISKS AND CD ROMS AND AMY DEVICE THAT CAN BE CONNECTED 
TO THE INTERNET. 
and ^hat said property or evidence: 
(X) is unlawfully acquired or unlawfully possessed. 
(X) has been used as a means of committing a public 
offense. 
(X) is being possessed with the purpose to use it as a 
means of committing or concealing a public offense. 
(X) consists of an item or constitutes evidence of illegal 
conduct, possessed by a party to the illegal conduct. 
( ) consists of an item or constitutes evidence of illegal 
conduct, possessed by a person or entity not a party to 
the illegal conduct. 
I believe the property and evidence described above is evidence 
of the crime of DISTRIBUTION OF METHAMPHETAMINE. 
The facts to establish the grounds for issuance of a Search 
Warrant, are: 
SEE: ATTACHMENT A AND B 
Your affiant considers the information received from the 
confidential informant reliable because (if any information is 
obtained from an unnamed informant): 
THE INFORMANT GAVE INFORMATION TN THE PAST THAT HAS BEEN 
PROVEN ACCURATE BY DET. THOMAS. 
Your affiant has verified the above information to be correct and 
accuirate because of the following independent investigation: 
DET. THOMAS SPOKE WITH A CITIZEN INFORMANT THAT CONFIRMED 
THE .INFORMATION GIVE BY THE CONFIDENTIAL, INFORMANT. 
WHEREFORE, the affiant prays that a Search Warrant be issued for 
the seizure of said items 
(X) m the daytime. 
( } at any time day or night because there is reason to 
believe it is necessary 1 o seise the property prior to 
it being concealed, destroyed, damaged, or altered, or 
for other good reason. 
(X) (no knock) to execute without notice of authority or 
purpose, (proof under oath being shown that the object 
of this search may be quj ckly destroyed or disposed of 
or that harm may result to any person if notice were 
given) . THAT SOME OF THE SUBJECTS GOING TO THIS 
RESIDENCE HAVE A HISTORY OP VIOLENCE RANGING FROM 
ASSAULT TO WEAPONS AND CONCEALED WEAPONS VIOLATIONS. IT 
IS ALSO THE EXPERIENCE AMD TRAINING OF YOUR AFFIANT 
THAT IF OFFICERS ARE ALLOWED THE ELEMENT OF SURPRISE, 
NOT ONLY IS THE EVIDENCE BETTER PRESERVED, BUT THE 
SAFETY OF THE OFFICERS, SUSPECTS, AND INNOCENT BY 
STANDERS ARE BETTER PROTECTED BECAUSE IT REMOVES THE 
POSSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE DESTRUCTION, HOSTAGE 
SITUATIONS, AND BARRICADED STAND-OFFS. 
FIANT 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 14TTT rlny of 
AUGUST, 2002. 
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Addendum D 
IN THE 6TH DISTRICT COURT 
COUNTY OP SANPETE, STATE OF UTAH 
STATS OP UTAH ) 
; ss. 
COUNrY OF SANPETE ) 
SEARCH WARRANT 
To any Peace Officer in the State of Utah: 
Proof of affidavit under oath having been made this day 
before me by DJ3T. CLARK THOMAS, I ,im satisfied that there is 
probable cause to believe that 
(X) on the premises known as 480 NORTH 100 WEST, MT. 
PLEA.3ANT, UTAH, THE RESIDENCE HAS WOOD SIDING SOME WHITE SOME 
BROWN. CHARCOAL COLORED ROOF. MAIN ENTRANCE FACES SOUTH. ALSO 
A WE;3T FACING DOOR ON THE NORTH END OF THE HOUSE. 
(X) in the vehicle (s) described as ANY VEHICLES AT THE 
RESIDENCE AT THE TIME OF THE EXECUTION OF THIS 
WARRANT. 
In the City of MT. PLEASANT, County of SANPETE, State of Utah, 
there is now certain property or evidence described as: 
(items in search of) 
METHAMPHETAMINE, PARAPHERNALIA TO CONSUME METHAMPHETAMINE, 
OWE SHEETS, PAPERS OR DOCUMENTS TO SHOW LEGAL OWNERSHIP OP THE 
HOME, SCALES AND PACKAGING MATERIAL. COMPUTER AND ANY DIGITAL 
STORAGE MEDIA THAT WOULD INCLUDE BUT NOT LIMITED TO 3X5 FLOPPY 
DISKS, ZIP DISKS AND CD ROMS AND ANY DEVICE THAT CAN BE CONNECTED 
TO THE INTERNET. 
which property or evidence: 
(X) is unlawfully acquired or unlawfully possessed. 
(X) has been used as a means to commit a public offense. 
(X) is being possessed with the purpose to use it as a 
means of committing or concealing a public offense. 
(X) consists of an item or constitutes evidence of illegal 
conduct, possessed by a party to the illegal conduct. 
( ) is evidence of illegal conduct in possession of a 
person or entity not a pe.rty to the illegal conduct and 
good cause being shown that the seizure cannot be 
obtained by subpoena without the evidence being 
concealed, destroyed, damaged, or altered. (Conditions 
for service of this Warrant are included or attached 
hereto) 
You are therefore commanded: 
(X) in the daytime 
( ) at any time day or night (good cause havi.nq b?e-n shown) 
(X) (no knock) to execute without notice of authority or 
purpose, (proof under oath being shown that the object 
of this search may be quickly destroyed or disposed of 
or that harm may result to any person if notice were 
given) THAT SOME OF THI1 SUBJECTS GOING TO THIS 
RESIDENCE HAVE A HISTORY OP VIOLENCE RANGING FROM 
ASSAULT TO WEAPONS AND CONCEALED WEAPONS VIOLATIONS. 
IT IS ALSO THE EXPERIENCE AND TRAINING OF YOUR AFFIANT 
THAT IF OFFICERS ARE ALLOWED THE ELEMENT OF SURPRISE, 
NOT ONLY IS THE EVIDENCE BETTER PRESERVED, BUT THE 
SAFETY OF THE OFFICERS, SUSPECTS, AND INNOCENT BY-
STANDERS ARE BETTER PROTECTED BECAUSE IT REMOVES THE 
POSSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE DESTRUCTION, HOSTAGE 
SITUATIONS, AND BARRICAEED STAND-OFFS. 
to rrake a search of the above-named or described person (s) , 
premises and vehicle(s) for the herein-above described property 
or evidence and if you find the same or any part thereof, to 
bring it forthwith before me at the 6TH DISTRICT Court, County of 
SANPETE, State of Utah, or retain such property in your custody, 
subject to the order of this Court. 
Given under my hand and dated this 14TH day of AUGUST, 2002. 
. Justice of I the Peace 
T^ jw cT* Court 
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Addendum E 
ATTACHMENT B 
GROUNDS FOR ISSUANCE OF A NON ALERT NO KNOCK SEARCH WARRANT 
INFORMATION RECEIVED BY DETECTIVE THOMAS OF THE TASK FORCE I S 
THAT SOME OF THE SUBJECTS GOINGTO T H I S RESIDENCE HAVE A HISTORY OF 
VIOLENCE RANGING FROM ASSAULT TO WEAPONS AND CONCEALED WEAPONS 
V I O L A T I O N S . I T I S ALSO THE EXPERIENCE AND TRAINING OF YOUR AFFIANT 
THAT I F OFFICERS ARE ALLOWED THE ELEMENT OF S U R P R I S E , NOT ONLY I S 
THE EVIDENCE BETTER PRESERVED, BLT THE SAFETY OF THE O F F I C E R S , 
S U S P 3 C T S , AND INNOCENT BY STANDERS ARE BETTER PROTECTED BECAUSE I T 
REMOVES THE P O S S I B I L I T Y OF EVIDENCE DESTRUCTION, HOSTAGE 
S I T U A T I O N S , AND BARRICADED S T A N D - O F F S . 
WE THEREFORE PRAY A NO-KNOCK NON ALERT SEARCH WARRANT BE 
G I V E N . 
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Addendum F 
1 informants here, and I do not know which one they speak 
2 of. 
3 The one indicates that they were watching the 
4 residence, and for some unspecified time period, certain 
5 people were arriving and leaving. 
6 There's another reference in the Affidavit that 
7 somebody — a confidential informant — a citizen 
8 informant, which we've — probably is the confidential 
9 informant, said that Paula Poulson was selling 
10 methamphetamine for Gary Sorensen. 
11 Is that — the citizen informant is now a 
12 confidential informant, or which one is the confidential 
13 informant? 
14 MR. KENNARD: Yes, Your Honor, if I can respond? 
15 I think what I did in my motion is: After I 
16 received his motion, I reviewed everything. And there is 
17 — there's two informants — no, there's three 
18 informants: One of them is a citizen informant; another 
19 one is a confidential informant; and then the one that he's 
2 0 speaking about now is a third informant. 
21 And that third informant is designated "citizen 
22 informant". 
23 MR. CARTER: And that's the one that says Paula was 
24 selling? 
25 MR. KENNARD: Yes. 
THE COURT: It is. 
MR. KENNARD: Two of them — two of the informants 
say that Paula was selling. 
This last one, when I found out now that she made 
this statement to the police, that she was incarcerated. 
And I don't think that she would qualify for the 
presumed reliability as a citizen informant, because she 
gave the confession, if you will, after she had been 
arrested. 
THE COURT: The last one? 
MR. KENNARD: The last one. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. KENNARD: So I put that in my motion just out of 
fairness to kind of, you know, let the Court know that 
probably what we are dealing with is someone who's not, you 
know, presumed to be reliable because they possibly could 
have had an axe to grind, could be asking, you know, for 
favors in return for this. 
But, really, I think the whole question comes down 
to whether the four corners of the — the four corners of 
that document, at the time it was signed by the Judge, 
established probable cause. 
And maybe this issue would go more toward whether 
there was some subversity (sic) by the police officers. 
THE COURT: All right. Where's the Affidavit? 
F 
